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Expectations,  Monetary Policy, and the 
Misalignment of Traded  Goods Prices 
Michael B. Devereux, University of British Columbia 
Charles Engel, University of Wisconsin  and NBER 
Between  the last day of March  2002,  and the last day of December  2004, 
the price  of a barrel  of crude  oil rose from  $26.31  to $43.45,  a 65.1  percent 
increase.  This  represents  a 55.1  percent  real  price  increase,  relative  to the 
U.S. consumer  price index (CPI).  Over the same period, the price of a 
barrel  of oil rose from  €30.18  to €32.09,  a 6.3 percent  increase.  Relative  to 
the French  CPI,  this was a 0.7 percent  increase,  and relative  to the Ger- 
man CPI,  a 2.5 percent increase.  Apparently,  the United States experi- 
enced a major  oil price  increase,  but Europe  did not. 
How can this be?  Mechanically,  these figures  indicate  that  there  was a 
very large depreciation  of the real CPI  dollar exchange rate relative to 
France  and Germany.  In fact, in nominal terms, the dollar depreciated 
55.3 percent over this period, while inflation in the United States was 
only slightly higher than in France  and Germany. 
It  would be absurd  to attempt  to explain  these movements  in a purely 
real, neoclassical model. Such an explanation would require a mas- 
sive increase in the excess supply of goods that are weighted heavily 
in the U.S. consumption  basket, relative to the excess supply of goods 
weighted heavily in the French  and German  baskets. 
However,  the movement in the nominal  exchange  rate  does not seem 
as difficult  to comprehend.  Asset prices are known to be volatile. While 
there  are  difficulties  reconciling  the volatility  of nominal  exchange  rates 
with the predictions  of rational  expectations  present  value models, these 
asset pricing  models might be able to account  for  big swings in nominal 
exchange  rates  by appealing  to changes  in expectations  about  future  in- 
flation  or money growth, for example.1 
If there are some nominal goods prices that are sticky in euros, and 
some that  are sticky  in dollars,  these nominal  exchange  rate  swings will 
lead to relative  price  changes  that  do not reflect  efficient  responses  to rel- 
ative scarcity.  This  is the point made by Devereux  and Engel  (2006,  here- 132  Devereux  and Engel 
inaf  ter  referred  to as DE06)  -  when some goods prices  are  sticky,  there  is 
a conflict  between the exchange  rate's  role as an asset price,  and its role 
as a determinant  of relative  goods prices.  As an asset  price,  the exchange 
rate might efficiently  respond to news about future conditions that af- 
fect the value of one currency  relative  to the other.  But  these factors  that 
determine  the nominal  exchange  rate  are  unlikely to be the same factors 
that would yield efficient relative goods price changes. Goods prices 
should be determined  by supply and demand, and not by expectations 
of future  monetary  conditions. 
It is important  to emphasize here that we are not referring  to a situa- 
tion in which foreign  exchange  is mispriced.  In recent  years,  policymak- 
ers have examined the problems  for monetary  policy when asset prices 
contain bubbles or otherwise appear not to be priced rationally.  Al- 
though such mispricing  of exchange  rates  might lead to problems  simi- 
lar  to the ones we examine  here,  we specifically  only consider  the case in 
which the nominal  exchange  rate  is determined  by a no-bubbles  rational 
expectations  equilibrium. 
Devereux  and Engel (2006)  recommend  that  monetary  policy be used 
to eliminate  the  effects  of news of future  fundamentals  on exchange  rates. 
Since  exchange  rates  and other  asset prices are primarily  determined  in 
the short  run by reaction  to news of the future  rather  than shocks to the 
current  fundamentals,  DE06 suggest that an optimal monetary  policy 
would largely  eliminate  unanticipated  exchange  rate  movements. 
Our purpose in this paper is to enrich the model of DE06. Earlier 
work, which has not considered the effects of news on exchange rates, 
has emphasized the importance of the price-setting assumption for 
monetary  policy rules in the open economy.  Producers  in each country 
set the price of their output in advance, but there are two different 
models of pricing  behavior.  If the price  is set in the producer's  currency 
and sold at the same price in the foreign country,  the model assumes 
producer-currency  pricing (PCP).  If producers  set a price in the home 
country  for sale to home consumers,  and a price in the foreign  currency 
for sale to foreign households, we say there is local-currency  pricing 
(LCP).  The literature  has emphasized that when pricing decisions are 
closer to the LCP configuration, optimal monetary policy stabilizes 
nominal  exchange  rates.2 
Here, we build a model very similar to that in Devereux and Engel 
(2003),  in which prices  are  set one period  in advance.  However,  we show 
that  optimal  (cooperative)  monetary  policy rules  should expunge the ef- 
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the assumption  of price setting. We shall refer  to this as stabilizing  the 
exchange rate,  because the optimal policy makes the conditional  vari- 
ance of exchange rates small. Exchange  rate shocks should occur only 
when there  are shocks to current  fundamentals. 
It is certainly  true  that  stabilizing  the nominal  exchange  rate  is a more 
important  consideration  for more open economies. But some (for ex- 
ample, Kollmann  2004) have claimed that there is essentially no gain 
from stabilizing  the exchange  rate  of the currency  of two countries  that 
trade  very little. So, since U.S.-European  trade represents  a small frac- 
tion of their  respective  gross domestic products (GDPs),  monetary  pol- 
icy can safely ignore  the euro  /dollar fluctuations  according  to this point 
of view. 
But  our  view is that  the volume of U.S.-European  trade  is a poor yard- 
stick to gauge the impact of the exchange rate on the economies of the 
United States  and Europe.  A change in that exchange rate  leads poten- 
tially to misalignments  in the prices of all traded  goods. The fraction  of 
goods whose prices  are set or strongly  influenced  by international  mar- 
kets is much larger than the import/GDP ratio. Oil prices are one ex- 
ample. The drop in the value of the dollar in 2002 to 2004 meant that 
Europe  was insulated  from  the oil price  shock that  hit the United States. 
Or put another  way, if the dollar  had not depreciated,  the price of oil in 
Europe  would have risen also. A smaller dollar price increase would 
have equilibrated  the oil market,  reducing the oil shock for the United 
States.3 
We do not attempt here to build and calibrate  a realistic  full macro 
model. We explore a series of toy models in this paper as a prelude to 
further  work. We  believe that this approach  helps to isolate the impor- 
tant features  of open economies that might influence monetary  policy 
decisions. 
As in DE06,  it is helpful to conclude this introductory  section with a 
discussion of how our arguments  in this paper differ from the existing 
literature.  First,  the existing monetary  policy literature  does not explic- 
itly consider the effect of news in open-economy models, except as 
agents learn  from changes in current  macro  fundamentals.  Second, op- 
timal policy in this setting is not achieved simply by eliminating  infla- 
tion. The sticky  price distortion  requires  eliminating  the effects of news 
on exchange rate changes, even if inflation  is controlled.  Third,  the ar- 
gument for stabilizing  exchange rates is different  than arguments  put 
forth  for  stabilizing  other  asset  prices.  The  only distortion  in our stylized 
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market distortions  to make our point  clear. The reason that exchange 
rates need  to be controlled  even when  inflation is driven to zero, even 
though the only distortion comes from sticky prices, is that prices are set 
in each currency so an exchange  rate change leads to a potentially  un- 
desirable relative price movement. 
The rest of the paper is organized  as follows.  The next section devel- 
ops the basic model  used throughout  the paper. Section 3.2 derives the 
flexible price solution of the model and establishes the principle that ef- 
ficient relative prices should  depend  only on contemporaneous  funda- 
mentals. Section 3.3 analyzes the solution under sticky prices, both with 
PCP and LCP pricing, and obtains the optimal monetary policy rules in 
each case, assuming money supply as an instrument of monetary policy. 
Section 3.4 shows the implications of the model for relative prices as well 
as some  other extensions.  Section 3.5 illustrates  that the main results 
carry over to the more realistic case of interest rate targeting for mone- 
tary policy. Some conclusions  then follow. 
3.1  Model 
There are two  symmetric  countries,  each with  a continuum  of house- 
holds normalized  in size to equal one. In each country, a continuum  of 
monopolists  produces  goods  that are considered  imperfect substitutes 
by consumer-households.  Goods are produced  using labor and a com- 
modity. Each country is endowed  with equal amounts of the nondurable 
commodity  each period,  and it is sold in a competitive  market to pro- 
ducers in each country. Households  consume  output of both countries, 
but their preferences exhibit home bias -  they weight  goods  produced 
in their own  country  more heavily  than imported  goods.  We assume 
there is a complete market for state-contingent bonds. 
3.1.1  Households 
Households  in each country maximize expected discounted  utility over 
an infinite horizon. The preferences of the representative household  in 
the home country are given by: 
Y = E0XP^  0<p<l, 
t=o 
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In this expression, Ct represents aggregate consumption, which is a 
Cobb-Douglas  function of home- and foreign-produced  consumption 
goods: 
ct = (cHty-«/2HcFy2, 7<=i. 
Preferences  exhibit  home bias when 7 < 1, so that  home consumers  put 
more weight [1 - (7 / 2)] on consumption  of the home good aggregate, 
CHr  Foreign  households have symmetric,  but not identical  preferences. 
They put weight 1 - (7 / 2) on consumption  of the foreign good aggre- 
gate, so that 
C* = (CS^C*)1"^. 
(Throughout  the paper,  a * signifies  the foreign  country  values.) In turn, 
CHt  and CFt  are Center for Economic Studies (CES) aggregates that 
equally  weight the continuum  of goods produced  in each country,  with 
elasticity  of substitution  equal to X. 
The  exact  price  index is given (up to a constant  of proportionality)  by: 
pt  = (pHty-{y/2)(pFtv/2. 
Variables  PHt  and PFt  are CES  price indexes defined over the continuum 
of goods produced in the home country and the foreign country,  re- 
spectively.  These  prices  are expressed  in nominal terms  in the domestic 
currency. 
We  assume real  balances  appear  in the utility function.  We follow the 
blueprint of Devereux and Engel (2003),  who in turn follow Obstfeld 
and Rogoff  (1995,  2000,  2002),  but generalize  the model to include home 
bias in preferences  and production  that uses a commodity as an input. 
Monetary  policy is expressed  as a money supply rule.  This is not a real- 
istic description  of how monetary  policy is set by most central  banks to- 
day,  but this paper  is not trying  to deliver a policy rule that  can  be taken 
off the shelf and used by policymakers.  The main ideas we are trying to 
convey hold whether  the central  bank controls  interest  rates  directly,  or 
controls  them indirectly  through the money supply. The last section of 
this paper shows how the results carry  through  when monetary  policy 
is set by an interest rate rule (which is the case considered in DE06.) 
However,  for pedagogical  reasons,  it is clearer  to present  the model ini- 
tially using money supply rules. 
Maximization  is done subject  to a standard  budget constraint.  With- 
out loss of generality,  home households can be assumed to own home 
firms. Households receive income from profits, wages, rents earned 
from  their  commodity  endowment,  and the payoffs from  their  state  con- 136  Devereux  and Engel 
tingent claims. They carry over money  balances from the previous  pe- 
riod, and receive lump-sum  monetary transfers from the government. 
They use their resources to buy consumption  goods,  to acquire money 
balances to hold in the current period,  and to acquire state contingent 
bonds (which can be held in negative  quantities) that pay off in the next 
period. 
Derivations  in this model  are quite  straightforward,  so in order to 
save space we will present only the log-linearized  first-order conditions 
of the households  (where the linearization  is done  around the nonsto- 
chastic steady  state). Lowercase letters represent the logs of the corre- 
sponding  uppercase letters. 
The tradeoffs between  leisure and consumption  for home and foreign 
households,  respectively, are given by: 
wt =  Pt +  Pct  (!) 
w* = p* + pc*.  (2) 
The log of the nominal  wage in the home country  is wr 
The  money demand  functions  are  derived from  the Euler  equation  for 
money balances,  in the home and foreign  countries: 
P  1 
™t  ~ Pt  = ~ct -  -r(Etpt+1  + pE,cf+1  -  pt -  pc,)  (3) 
m*  _ p*  = P * _ 1 (EfP?+i  + pE^f+i  _ p*  _ pc*).  (4) 
Here, i = (1 + tt)/P - 1 is the steady-state  nominal  interest  rate,  where it 
is the steady-state  inflation  rate,  which will be the same in both countries 
under the following assumptions. 
With Cobb-Douglas  preferences,  the ratio of expenditure on home 
and foreign  aggregates  is a constant  in each country: 
Prt +  CFt  =  Vm +  CHt  (5) 
rFt ^  LFt  Vm ^  LHr  \°) 
The consumption  aggregate  in each country  can be defined: 
c«  = 
(1-y)c«« 
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The price indexes are: 
p,  = 
(i-y)pH, 
+ yp«  (9) 
pf=ip*H(+(i-iy*R-  do) 
Through trade in state-contingent bonds, households  in each country 
equate  the  marginal  utility  of  an  additional  dollar  of  consumption 
across all states at each time. These first-order conditions  can be sum- 
marized by: 
p, + pc, = st + p* + pc*,  (11) 
where st is the log of the home currency price of foreign currency. 
3.1.2  Firms 
Output is produced using labor and a commodity  in each country. In ad- 
dition, there are country-specific productivity  shocks. 
As we have noted, in each country there is a continuum  of monopo- 
listic firms that each produces a final consumption  good. 
The production functions for representative firm / in each country are 
CES, with elasticity of substitution  of 6: 
YHt(i)  = ^a1/e[L,(/)](e'1)/e + (1 " ay'tiXMY*-"'9)*"*-" 
Y* (0 = ^*{a1/e[L*(z)](B-1)/e  + (1 -  a)1/e[X*(0](e-1)/e}e/(8~1). 
Labor input in the home country for firm i is Lt(i),  Xt(i) is the input of the 
commodity  for firm i, and % is the home productivity  level, common to 
all home firms. 
The log-linearized  production  functions  (dropping  the index  i) are 
given by: 
yHt  = yt + orf, + (1 -  a)xt  (12) 
y*  = V* + erf* + (1 -  a)x*.  (13) 
The log of the home productivity  shock can be decomposed  into two 
components: 
y,  = ut + vt_v 138  Devereux  and  Engel 
The notion is that agents receive news about productivity  in advance. 
We  express that  by saying that  the vt-1  component  of time t productivity 
is observed one period in advance,  at time t-1.  Similarly, 
\|/* = u* + v*_v 
We will consider two different  models for the evolution of shocks:  one 
in which all components are purely independent and identically dis- 
tributed (i.i.d.) so all shocks are temporary;  and another in which all 
components  are pure random  walks, so that all shocks are permanent. 
Factor  demands are given by: 
**-**=  -8<P* " «>t)  (14) 
x*  - e* = -e(P* - Wf).  (15) 
The nominal  price of the commodity in the home country  is Pxt 
When goods prices are flexible, each firm sets its goods price as a 
markup  over unit cost. We shall assume, however, that  the government 
subsidizes output of each firm so that in fact it produces at an efficient 
level, and sets price equal to unit cost. This assumption  will guarantee 
us that the flexible-price  equilibrium  is also efficient.4  The price equa- 
tions are given by: 
Pm  = awt + (1 -  a)Pxt  ~ V,  (16) 
p* = aw* + (1 -  a)p* -  \|/*.  (17) 
Each  of the unique  consumption  goods could, in principle,  be priced  dif- 
ferently  in the home and foreign  countries,  because  we will assume that 
firms can costlessly segment the markets.  However, since the demand 
function  for  each  good is the same  among  home and foreign  households, 
the desired price set by each firm for the home and foreign market  is 
identical.  So we have that the law of one price  holds for each good: 
PHt  = st + P*Ht  (18) 
PF*  = st + p*Ft.  (19) 
While  all of the other  equations  presented  so far  hold whether  prices  are 
flexible  or set in advance,  we emphasize  that  equations  (16)  and (17)  per- 
tain only to the flexible-price  version of the model. Equations  (18) and 
(19)  will hold in the PCP  version of the sticky-price  model, but not in the 
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3.1.3  Equilibrium 
The  commodity  is freely  traded  on world markets,  and so it has a single 
world price: 
P* = s, + p£.  (20) 
The world endowment of the commodity is xt,  which is a random  vari- 
able.  We  will assume that  no information  about  xt  is known until time t, 
at which time it is fully known. 
The log-linearized  commodity  market  resource  constraint  is: 
xt = 
\xt 
+ ix*.  (21) 
The weights are 1/2, on home and foreign log commodity demand be- 
cause of the symmetry of the home and foreign country in the non- 
stochastic  steady state. 
The log-linearized  market  clearing  conditions for home and foreign 
goods can be summarized  as: 
y«  = 
(1-y)c» 
+ Yc»  ^ 
V%  = 
%cR  + {l-  |)c* 
.  (23) 
When prices are flexible, equations (1) through (23) determine the 
twenty-three  variables:  wt,  wf, yHt,  y%,  (t, xt, €*,  xf, ct,  cHt,  cFt,  c*,  c%,  c%, 
Vt>  Vm>  P«/ P*/  Pm  P»/ V%  V%>  and sr In the PCP  model, we have that  pHt 
and ip%t  are set one period ahead, so that equations (16) and (17) do not 
hold. The remaining twenty-one equations determine the remaining 
twenty-one  variables.  In  the LCP  model,  pHt  , pFt  , p%t  , and  p%  are  set in ad- 
vance. Equations  (16) to (19) do not hold in the LCP  model, and the re- 
maining  nineteen  equations  determine  the remaining  nineteen  variables. 
3.2  Flexible Price Solution 
The solution to the model under the assumption of flexible prices pro- 
vides a benchmark.  We have noted that, with the optimal production 
subsidies to monopolists in place, the equilibrium  under flexible  prices 
is efficient.  We will see that in some cases analyzed below, even with 140  Devereux  and Engel 
sticky  prices,  the efficient  allocation  is obtainable  with appropriate  mon- 
etary  policy. 
For  any variable  zt  and its foreign  counterpart,  zf, we will define 
yR =  7  -  7*  £t  &t  7  - 
£t  , 
-  = *, + *,* 
Zt  = 
2  ' 
the relative  and world values of these variables.5 
Devereux and Engel (2006)  emphasize that the theorem derived by 
Barro  and King (1984)  applies to this model: even though expectations 
are forward  looking, because preferences  are time separable,  there are 
no durable goods (except the moneys), and markets  are complete, the 
(real)  prices and quantities  depend only on the current  period values of 
the exogenous variables  -  \\ft,  \|/*, and xt  -  and not on the expected fu- 
ture  values. The solutions do not depend on any assumptions  about  the 
stochastic  processes  for these exogenous variables. 
This  is a key insight:  relative  prices  are  determined  by relative  scarcity 
of goods or factors,  not by expectations  about the future. Expectations 
can play a role in determining  money prices (and demand for money), 
because money is a durable asset. But under flexible prices, money is 
neutral  in this model, so expectations  of the future  play no role  in the de- 
termination  of equilibrium  relative  prices or real  allocations. 
Here we present  the solutions for aggregate  consumption  and output 
in each country,  and the solutions for relative  prices: 
1-7  ,  ,  1 -  a(l  -  9) _  1-a  _ 
c<  = 
"Sp* 
, +  , 
i-a(i-ep)^ 








a _ a(1 _ ep) % 
_  + 
1 _ a(1 _ ep)x, 
(25) 
(p -  1)(1  -  7)2  .  ,  «9(1  -  p)  _  ,  1-a  _ 
y* = v, ￿￿￿￿ 
yp 
￿￿￿￿  v' 
.  +  , 
i-a(i-eP)¥<+i-a(i-9p)*< 
_  ,  _ 
(26) 
(p -  1)(1 -  7)2  a9(l -  p)  1-a 
Pr,-Pn,=K-PH,  = V!  (28) Expectations,  Monetary  Policy,  and the Misalignment  of Prices  141 
1  .  ,  p(l  -  a(l  ~ 6)) _  <  p(l -a)  _ 
«,-?»=  2* 
. +  , 
i-ad-ep)  v'+i-a(i-eP)x' 
_  <  _ 
(29) 
1  1 -  a(l  -  6) _  pa 




Consumption  and prices  depend only on the current  level of produc- 
tivity and supply of the commodity.  Note also, the log of the real ex- 
change  rate  is proportional  to the terms  of trade: 
qt  = st + p* -  pt  = (1 -  7)vf • 
We could use equations (3) and (4) along with the solutions for con- 
sumption  in (24)  and (25),  in conjunction  with some assumptions  about 
the money supply process to solve for nominal price levels. Because 
equations (3) and (4) are forward  looking, the nominal price levels de- 
pend upon expectations  of future consumption,  and hence future pro- 
ductivity  levels, as well as expectations  about  money supplies.  However, 
the nominal price levels have no influence  on real prices or allocations 
under flexible  prices. 
3.3  Sticky Prices Solution and Monetary  Policy 
We begin this section by making some assumptions about the money 
supply process.  We  assume that  money supplies in each country  are de- 
termined  by: 
mt = m,_a  + p.t  + bt_,  (31) 
mf = m*_!  + tf  + 8*_r  (32) 
Monetary  policy rules are  designed to respond  to unanticipated  shocks, 
so £,_>,)  = EM(tf) = 0, and E«(8M) = £^(8^)  = 0 will hold. Here 
|x,(|x*)  is an addition to the time t information  set, while S^S*^) is an 
addition to the time t -  1 information  set. Note that this assumption 
means  that  conditionally  (on time  t information)  expected  money growth 
will vary over time, although the unconditional  expectation  of money 
growth is zero. This  monetary  rule is designed so that  the |x,  component 
reacts  to the components  of productivity,  ut  and u*, that are  news in pe- 
riod t  , while the $,_a  component  reacts  to the components  of this period's 
productivity,  vt  or vf, that were learned  in period t - 1. In other  words, 
the monetary authorities commit in period t to change the money 
supply between t + 1 and t by an amount  that is expected to equal 8r 142  Devereux  and Engel 
We introduce  some new notation.  For  any variable  zt+j,j  > 0 define 
In other words, £tzt+j  is the news received at time t about variable  zt+j. 
When; = 0, we will write simply zt = zt  - Et_rzt  for innovations  in zr6  Un- 
der this notation,  \j/,  = ut,  and £,\|/,+1  = vt, for example. 
We will assume that nominal prices are set one period in advance. 
Firms  set prices to maximize the value of the firm.  In the first  case, we 
will consider PCP firms. Home firms set prices in home currency  and 
foreign firms set prices in foreign currency.  In that case, equations (16) 
and (17)  are replaced  by: 
pHt  = E^aw,  + (1 -  a)pxt  -  \|/J  (33) 
p* = E^law*  + (1 -  a)p* -  V*].  (34) 
We will the also consider  LCP  firms.  These firms  set a price one period 
in advance in domestic currency for sale to households in the home 
country,  and a price in foreign currency  for sale to foreign  households. 
Equations  (33)  and (34)  determine  pHt  and p%.  In addition,  for  LCP  firms, 
equations  (18)  and (19)  are replaced  by: 
Pfft  = E*-A + PJi,  (35) 
Pr = Et-ist + P%-  (36) 
In this section, we assume that the shocks  -  ut,  u*, vt,  vf, and xt  -  are 
purely transitory  (mean  zero, i.i.d.) 
Because  prices  are  expected  (at  time t) to be at their  flexible  price  equi- 
librium  levels at time t + 1 (compare  equations  (33)  through  (34)  to (16) 
through (17), and additionally for the LCP case, (35) to (36) to (18) to 
(19)),  consumption  in period t + 1 is expected to be at its efficient  level. 
From  equation  (26)  we have: 
.  1-7  p  l-a(l-e) 
^ 








It is useful to note that ttmt+k  = ttmM,  and £tct+k  = 0, k > 2. It follows 
from pushing equation (3) ahead two periods that £,p,+2  =  %rnt+2  = 
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£,m,+1  - £,p(+1  = -£(c(+1  - -  (£,p(+2  + Pttct+2  - £,p(+1  - p£,c(+1). 
We can solve this out to write: 
.  .  p(l  + /) 
£,P,+i = £,™m - 
1 + fe  Vm-  (39) 
3.3.1  PCP 
Recall p, = (1 -y/2)pHt  + (y/2)(st + p*,),  so under PCP we have ft = (7/2)3,. 
Also note £,mf+1  = mt + 8r Taking innovations in equation (3), we get 
P  1 
™t-Pt  = Z£t 
~  -  (£A+i  + P£A+i " P, -  pct). 
t  it 
Using these relationships along with equation (39) to get: 
c.  -4*.-  r) 
-  ^^ 
+ 
a  1(^ 
" 
fe)  ^»-  I*) 
where <t>  = (1 + /e)/[p(l + 01- 
The analogous expression  for innovations  in foreign consumption  is 
given by 
g - «W  * & * ^~)  f  + (1  I'  i,a  ! ie)  ^r  <«> 
From the risk-sharing condition  (11) we have 
(1 -  7)gf = p(ct -  c*). 
Taking the difference between equations (40) and (41), and using the dif- 
ference between equations (37) and (38), we can derive: 
1 + ie  1 
l'=l  + I[l-7(l-e)]'fi' 
+ 
l  + ,[l-7(l-e)]8' 
(42) 
(1 + fe){l + i[l  -  7(1 -  e)]} 
' (+1 
1 + ie  1  = ￿￿￿￿  m"R  A  ￿￿￿￿  8R 
1 + i[\  -  7(1 -  e)] 
'  1 + i[l  -  7(1 -  e)] 
f 
(1 -  7)t(e -  1) 
(l  + ie){l+;[l-7(l-e)]}l'f' 144  Devereux  and Engel 
The last term shows the influence of expected future fundamentals on 
the nominal exchange rate. Substituting (42) and (37) into equation (41), 
we can also see the influence  of expected  future fundamentals  on cur- 
rent consumption. 
The exchange rate is the sum of revisions to current fundamentals and 
expectations  of  future  fundamentals.  Current fundamentals  are un- 
anticipated movements  in relative money  growth across the home and 
foreign country. Expectations  of future productivity  shocks, however, 
affect the exchange  rate currently. This is explained  as follows.  When 
vt > v*, there is a shock to future home productivity  that exceeds that to 
future foreign productivity.  If in addition  7 <  1, this must increase an- 
ticipated consumption  at home more than in the foreign country, since 
home residents' consumption  is more sensitive  to home productivity  in 
the presence of home bias in preferences. From (3), holding  the current 
monetary innovation  constant, a rise in expected  future home  relative 
consumption  will increase the home nominal interest rate, relative to the 
foreign nominal interest rate, when  8 >  1. This will reduce demand for 
money at home relative to the foreign country, and as a result there is an 
unanticipated home currency depreciation. Finally, future fundamentals 
also incorporate future changes in the relative money  supplies,  8, -  8*, 
which  can be  forecasted  based  on  announcements  of  future  relative 
technology  growth rates. 
Note that the key feature of this mechanism  is that the exchange rate 
responds  to future fundamentals.  That is, the time t +  1 productivity 
shock becomes  known  at time t, and generates news,  which  leads the 
current exchange  rate to move,  and  the resulting  changes  in the ex- 
pected future money supply have a similar effect. 
Using equations  (5)-(ll),  we can derive: 
.  (1 -  7)2 + P7(2 ~ 7). 
Vm  ~ yFt 
.  = ￿￿￿￿  sr  (43) 
A future productivity  boom in the home country or anticipated future 
money growth in the home country (in both cases, relative to the foreign 
counterpart) will  lead  to a home  depreciation  (e >  1). From the risk- 
sharing  condition,  home  consumption  rises  relative  to  foreign  con- 
sumption  when s rises. This is associated with a boom in domestic out- 
put relative to foreign. 
It is well known that in this setting, when no shocks are anticipated, a 
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tions.7 Suppose m, - m,,, = |x(  and \|ff  = u(. Then with a bit of work, equa- 
tions (40) through (42) can be solved  to give: 
,[2(1-7X1+0  + 7(1 + fe)  +  7(1 + fe)  J  ,,,,  C>  = 
*{  2 + 2i[l - 7d - e)]  ^ + 
2 + 2i[l-7(l-e)]^j 
(44)  ,,,, 
f  -y(l  + fe)  +  ,  2(1  - 7)(1 + 0 + 7(1 + «)  J  ,,„  C*  = 
<1>t2  + 2/[l-7(l-e)]ft' 
+  , 
2 + 2f[l -  7d - e)]  * 
]' 
,,„  (45) 
These two equations  give ct  and c* as linear  functions  of |x,  and |ul*.  The 
optimal solutions for ct and cf, given in equations (24) and (25), have 
home and foreign  consumption  solved as functions  of ut,  u*f  and xr So, 
monetary  policy can replicate  the optimal consumption levels using a 
policy that equates the right-hand  sides of equations (44) and (45)  with 
the right-hand  sides of equations (24) and (25), respectively,  and then 
solves for |x,  and |x*  as linear  functions  of ut,  u*, and xr It is tedious but 
straightforward  to confirm  that the policies that solve these equations 
will also yield solutions for relative  prices under PCP  that replicate  the 
flexible  price  solutions  given in equations  (28)  through  (30).  We  shall  not 
elaborate  on this aspect of the optimal  monetary  policy further. 
What is of interest,  here, however, is the distortion  caused by the ef- 
fect  of anticipated  future  disturbances  -  anticipated  future  productivity 
and money growth  -  on current  output, consumption,  and price levels. 
Can  we design a policy that  eliminates  these effects  as well, and delivers 
the flexible  price allocation?  What  are the properties  of such a policy? 
In the PCP  model, the sticky price distortion  manifests  itself through 
terms  of trade  movements that do not replicate  the optimal reaction  of 
the terms of trade to current  productivity levels, as given in equation 
(28).  If there  were no anticipated  shocks,  the optimal  exchange  rate  pol- 
icy would deliver an exchange rate that mimicked the terms of trade. 
That  is, with p%  and PHt  fixed one period in advance,  innovations  in the 
terms of trade,  st + p*t  - PHt,  are just determined  by innovations in the 
nominal exchange rate.  Common wisdom (supported  by the empirical 
work of DE06)  is that short-run  exchange rate movements are largely 
driven  by news about  the future.  In the context  of this model, this means 
that  the variances  of vt,  v*, &„  and 8* are much larger  than the variances 
of \Lt,  |x*,  ut,  u*, and xr Therefore,  the policies that  target  news about  the 
future are far more important in delivering desirable terms of trade 
movements  and real  exchange  rate  movements  than  the policies that  tar- 
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Proposition 1. The  optimal  monetary  policy  sets 
_  pi(e-l)f  _  pi(e -  1) \l-y  R  + 
1 -  a(l  -  6) _]  6<~  _ 
(1 + te)  ft+1  _ 
(1 + te)  [  2p  Vt  R  + 
1 -  a(l  -  Op)  Vt\ 
p/(e-l)  .  p/(e-l)  [7-1  l-a(l-e)_] 
(1 + te)  tCt+1 
. 
(1 + te)  [  2p  ^  1 -  a(l  - 
Op)*']' 
77ms  po/icy  eliminates  the  effects  of news  on nominal  exchange  rates. 
Proof. It  follows directly  from  equations  (40)  and (41)  that  these  policies 
eliminate  the influence  of news on current  consumption.  Inspection  of 
equation (42) shows that it also eliminates the effects of news on ex- 
change rates. 
In practical  terms, a policy that eliminates the effects of news on ex- 
change  rates  will substantially  stabilize  exchange  rates  (making  the con- 
ditional  variance  of exchange  rates  very small).  Notice if the home coun- 
try  follows the policy set out in the Proposition  for  ht,  the foreign  country 
could set its policy to drive the effect  of news on exchange  rates  to zero. 
That is, from (42), the foreign country could eliminate the impact of 
news on the exchange  rate  by setting 
6(  6l  (1 + it) Vl+r 
With  the home country  setting bt  as given in the Proposition,  this policy 
for the foreign  country  would be identical  to the optimal  rule  for  the for- 
eign country  given in the Proposition.  Ignoring  the effects  of contempo- 
rary  shocks to the fundamentals  on exchange  rates,  the optimal  cooper- 
ative policy could be implemented  by having the home country  follow 
the policy that delivers its individually optimal level of consumption, 
and having the foreign  country  target  shocks to exchange  rates. 
33.2  LCP 
Under LCP  we have pt  = 0. Following the steps used to derive equation 
(40),  but with this expression for the innovation in the consumer  price 
level, we find under LCP: 
£'  =  ^' + 
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1  *  ' 
p(l + 0 
' 
(1 + Od + fe) 
"+v  (  ' 
From  the risk-sharing  condition (11)  we have under LCP 
3, = P(c,  -  2f  ). 
As with the derivation of equation (42), take the difference between 
equations (46) and (47), and use the difference  between equations (37) 
and (38),  to derive: 
s<  = 
777  mf  + T778f  + 
(i + fe)(i  + o^ 
= ￿￿￿￿  mf  f H  ￿￿￿￿  8f  f + ￿￿￿￿  -  ￿￿￿￿  - v?  .  (47)  1 + i  f  1 + f  f 
(l  + fe)(l  + 0 
Qualitatively, news has a similar impact under local-currency pricing 
as it does under producer-currency pricing. We also now have: 
yH,-y?,  = 
-^p^(.  (49) 
But  we can make an even stronger  statement  about optimal  policy: 
Proposition  2. The optimal rules  for 8, and 8* are the same as under PCR 
They  also eliminate  the effects  of news on exchange  rates,  as under  PCR 
Proof. This  comes from  inspection  of (46)  through  (48). 
Devereux  and Engel  (2003,  2007),  Monacelli  (2005),  Sutherland  (2005), 
and Corsetti  and Pesenti (2005)  have emphasized that  under LCP,  mon- 
etary policy's response to shocks to the current  fundamentals  cannot 
replicate  the flexible-price  equilibrium.  That  result holds in this model 
as well. But  if exchange  rates  are primarily  driven  by news, the optimal 
response to news will involve stabilizing  the exchange  rate.  In contrast 
to what previous studies have emphasized,  in response  to news, the op- 
timal  policy is identical  under PCP  and LCP. 
Standard  Optimal  Currency  Area (OCA)  reasoning  suggests that it is 
efficient  to allow the exchange rate to respond to country-specific  pro- 
ductivity  shocks.  We  find,  in the absence  of a monetary  response,  that  in- 
deed the exchange rate will respond to announcements of country- 
specific  productivity  shocks.  The  direction  of movement  depends on the 
size of e. For  e > 1, the exchange rate will depreciate  in response to an 148  Devereux  and Engel 
announced  future home productivity  expansion.  It is tempting to inter- 
pret this movement  along efficiency  (or OCA) lines -  the future home 
productivity  expansion should cause a home-country  terms of trade de- 
terioration. Hence,  the response  of agents  forecasting  this in financial 
markets leads to an immediate nominal exchange rate depreciation. 
But the problem with this reasoning is that the immediate response of 
the current nominal exchange rate causes a change in the current real ex- 
change rate (by different degrees in the PCP and LCP environments), be- 
cause current nominal  prices cannot respond  to the announced  future 
shock. In the absence  of a current (as opposed  to future) productivity 
shock, however,  there is no efficiency reason for the real exchange rate 
to move  at all. In fact, movements  in the real exchange  rate are associ- 
ated with welfare losses since they push consumption  and employment 
away from their efficient levels. 
Thus, in a sticky price environment, when the exchange rate responds 
to news, there is no guarantee that it will do so in an efficient manner. In- 
deed,  in our model,  the optimal monetary rule should  prevent the ex- 
change rate from responding  to news  about future fundamentals  at all. 
The critical requirement  is that there not be  any  unanticipated  move- 
ments  in the exchange  rate. That is, the time  t exchange  rate will  be 
known in time t -  1. 
Of course the model is quite stylized,  since we have assumed  that all 
prices can adjust before the news  takes effect. But this is not necessarily 
unrealistic. At an anecdotal level, we see the exchange rate responding 
to all types  of potential  events  (e.g., effects of Social Security changes 
that may affect the budget  deficit in five or more years' time) that may 
occur much  further in the future than would  be relevant for business 
cycle frequencies.  These exchange  rate movements  are not necessarily 
desirable,  because  we  have  to  recognize  that the  response  to  future 
shocks may not be consistent with the currently desired structure of rel- 
ative prices. 
3.4  International  Goods Prices and Extensions 
From  equations  (1)  through  (2),  (7)  through  (8),  and (11)  through  (15),  we 
can write in all models of price setting: 
Pxt  ~ Pt = PCt  + -  (ct -Wt-  *t)  (50) 
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Holding consumption  levels and current  productivity  levels constant,  a 
decline in the world supply of the commodity raises the relative CPI 
price  of the commodity  in both countries. 
Solving out for consumption,  in a flexible  price  world, we find: 
1-7  1 -  ap(l -  6) _  ap 







Optimally,  relative  prices  should reflect  only current  productivity  levels 
and the current  supply of the commodity. 
Under sticky prices, relative  prices do not respond optimally to pro- 
ductivity levels or scarcity of the commodity. If there were no news 
about the future, the relative prices would still not be optimal under 
nominal  price  stickiness,  unless monetary  policy can deliver the correct 
levels of consumption  in equations  (50)  and (51)  that  allow the economy 
to replicate  the relative price solutions given in (52) through (53). We 
have noted that  optimal  monetary  policy can achieve this allocation  un- 
der PCP  but not under LCP. 
As we emphasized in the introduction,  we are concerned with the 
large  swings in Pxt  - pt  relative  to p*t  - p*  -  a difference  that  does not seem 
by changes in relative current  productivity levels in final goods. This 
difference is equal to the real exchange rate, and the swings may be 
driven by the expectations  of future productivity  or monetary  growth 
that  influence  the nominal  exchange  rate. 
The following example illustrates  the issue. Suppose the commodity 
supply follows an i.i.d.  process,  and there  is an unexpected  decline  in the 
supply of commodities,  so xt is negative. Assume there are no innova- 
tions in the current  productivity  levels: ut = u* = 0. From  (52)  and (53), 
under flexible  prices  we have: 
ap  _  ap  _ 
p--ft  = 
-i-a<i-ep)ii 
_ 
P*-A*  = 
-i-«(i-eP)*<- 
_ 
Under sticky prices, the actual innovations in relative prices in each 
country depend on expectations  and monetary policy rules. Suppose, 
for example under PCP,  that |x,  and jljl*  are set optimally to respond to 
current  commodity supply disturbances,  but the rules for 8, and 8* de- 
viate from the optimal rules set forth in proposition 1. Specifically,  de- 
fine the deviations from optimal  policy: 150  Devereux  and Engel 
Then, we can write: 
-  _  ap  -  * 
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p*  p<  i-a(i-eP)x'  i + r1 
+ ￿￿￿￿  3<L±^  ￿￿￿￿  S(  m +  *  £ 
2(1 + i){l + ill  -  7(1 -  e)])  S( + 
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Under  this policy,  the relative  prices  respond  correctly  (by construction) 
to the supply shock,  but their  value also depends on anticipated  future 
productivity  and money growth. The difference  between the two rela- 
tive prices is given by: 
ft,  - ft  - W  - P?)  =  (i - y)st  = ! +  /[11_"J1  _ e)]  & 
and thus will be influenced  by anticipated  future shocks, unless mone- 
tary  policy is set optimally  as in proposition  1. 
Examination of these equations show how  a commodity supply 
shock,  xt,  could have different  effects  on relative  prices  in the two coun- 
tries if optimal monetary  policies are not followed. Depending on the 
policy errors,  £, and £*,  we could see a situation  where the entire  price  ef- 
fect  of a decline  in commodity  supply is felt in the home country  -  a pos- 
itive pxt  - pt  -  with no change  in the foreign  country  (p*  - pf = 0). That  is 
precisely  the situation  that  could lead to a situation  in which the United 
States  experienced  the large  increase  in the relative  price  of oil in 2002  to 
2004,  while the relative  price increase  in Europe  was minimal. 
3.4.1  Permanent  Shocks 
We  have assumed  so far  that  productivity  shocks  are  transitory,  but  noth- 
ing depends on that  assumption.  Here  we turn  briefly  to the case of per- 
manent  productivity  shocks. 
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sumption.  However,  now we have £tct+k  = £tct+1  and (as before)  ttmt  +k  = 
ttmt+v  k > 2. It follows from  equation  (3) pushed ahead one period that 
t 
It  is straightforward  to verify  under  the  PCP  assumption  that: 
/  y  \  1  e-1  . 
1 + ie  ^R  1  R 
Sf"l  + f[l-7(l-e)]m' 
^R  + 
l + /[l-7(l-e)]  ' 
P(e  ~ 1)  f  R  + 
e|l  + f[l-7(l-e)]} 
f  (C(+r 
Proposition  1 still  holds,  however,  with the  optimal  policies  modified  to: 
pCe^  £(C(+I"  P(e-D[l-7  ^+ 
l-a(l-e) 
_|  8("  e  £(C(+I"  e  [  2p  ^+ 
l-ad-Gp)^ 
pCe-2)  ^p^e-l)^ 
l-a(l-e)  1 
Under LCP,  we have: 
£'  =  *• +  ^(ITT)  8'  +  ifTo £(C'+1 
S(  l + fm'  l + f6'  e(l + 0  "+r 
Proposition  2 still holds as stated. 
3.5  Interest  Rate Rules 
Devereux and Engel (2006) examine a model similar to the one pre- 
sented previously.  However,  instead of one-period  ahead  pricing,  DE06 152  Devereux  and Engel 
assume prices are set according to a modified  Calvo rule.8 That leads to 
asynchronized  price setting -  firms with identical costs and facing iden- 
tical demand curves will have different market prices because they have 
adjusted prices at different dates. Devereux  and Engel (2006) consider 
the optimal interest rate rule in this setting. The production structure is 
a simplified  version  of the model  here, because  in DE06 only  labor is 
used as an input, and the optimal interest rate rule is derived only when 
prices are set by PCP and productivity  shocks are transitory. 
The standard result in this literature is that with  PCP firms, policy- 
makers have an incentive to eliminate the price distortion by driving in- 
flation to zero, and the resulting allocation is efficient.9 Distortions  are 
eliminated  if policy  eliminates  changes  in pHt  and p*r Indeed,  if there 
were no news  about the future, policies that drive producer-price infla- 
tion to zero in each country allow the economy  to achieve the first-best 
allocation.  The nominal  exchange  rate would  adjust endogenously  to 
achieve the optimal terms of trade. 
However,  in the set up of DE06, when  news  affects exchange  rates, 
then simply  targeting inflation is not sufficient. Monetary policy  must 
act in a way to eliminate the effects of anticipated future changes on cur- 
rent allocations.  Such a policy, DE06 show,  implies  stabilizing  the ex- 
change rate response to news. 
We have examined optimal money supply rules, but here we shall dis- 
cuss interest rate rules, and show that our central conclusions  are not al- 
tered.10  We shall follow  DE06, and consider only the case of PCP with 
transitory productivity  shocks. It is straightforward  to go through the 
entire taxonomy  of other cases. We will also follow  DE06 and focus on 
the effects of anticipated future productivity shocks, and accordingly set 
ut =  u* = 0, so that all productivity  changes are foreseen one period in 
advance. Analogously,  we will hold the supply  of the commodity  con- 
stant. As  such,  we  are now  essentially  considering  a special  case  of 
DE06, one where  the fraction of firms that adjust prices each period is 
one.11  Obviously  the general results of DE06 go through in this case, but 
it is worthwhile  to draw the link explicitly. 
Suppose  the home and foreign interest rate rules are given by: 
it = <rnt  + 8,  (54) 
if  = air* + 8*,  (55) 
where it, = pHt  - pH  t_x  and it* = p%  - p%  t_v  We want to consider the form 
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In DE06, part of an optimal rule requires setting a to be very large, to 
eliminate  the distortion  caused  by asynchronous  price setting  in each 
country. With one period  ahead price setting,  all price setting  is syn- 
chronized. But we note here that the Taylor principle holds even in this 
context: we need a >  1 for price-level determinacy. 
The first-order conditions  for the households'  optimization  problems 
in the home and foreign country yield, respectively: 
h = p(E,c,+i " ct) + E,p,+1  -  p,  (56) 
i7 = p(Efc*+1-c*)  + E,p*+1-p*.  (57) 
The optimal allocations are then given by equations (24) through (30), 
recognizing  that we are assuming  \\ft  = vt_x  and \\ff = v*_^ 
Under PCP, prices are set according to (33) and (34). If we  use these 
equations  in conjunction  with  (54) to (57), the risk-sharing  condition 
(11), and the definitions  of the price indexes  (9) and (10), the model can 
be solved. 
First, suppose  that the central banks target only inflation, so that o, = 
8* = 0. Use the notation for the terms of trade, Tt  = st + p%  - pHt.  Under 
PCP, innovations  in the terms of trade are equivalent  to innovations  in 
the nominal exchange rate. 
Equating the right-hand sides of (54) and (56), and taking expectations 
at time t - 1, we get a solution for irf: 
<nr,  =  -pE^c,  -  -E,_lT(  = -  v*_t  - 
j _  a(1 _  6p) 
*.-,-  (58> 
where  the second  equality  follows  from equations  (24) and  (28). The 
equation for the foreign interest rate is symmetric, so that 
<r(ir,  -  O  =  -vlv 
We have it  - if = E,t,+1  - Tf  + Et(irt+1  - ir*+1),  since interest parity holds 
to a first-order approximation. Using EtTt+l  = vt-  vf, we get: 
t, =  ~(h  ~  if)  + vt ~  vf  + E,(tt,+1  -  <+1).  (59) 
Combining this with (58) and its foreign counterpart, we find 
T^v^-vU  + 
^-^^-vf).  (60) 
Recall that the optimal terms of trade are given by t, = vt_x  - v*_v  We see 
in (60) that no matter what the degree of inflation targeting, the terms of 154  Devereux  and  Engel 
trade  respond optimally  to the current  productivity  level. But  for all ad- 
missible values of a (since we must have a > 1), expected future pro- 
ductivity levels also influence  the terms  of trade. 
It is apparent  from  inspection  of equation  (59)  that  the general  form  of 
the interest  rate rules (54) and (55) that will eliminate  the effects of an- 
ticipated  shocks on the terms  of trade  require: 
5,-8;  = 
^>,-i?). 
Under this type of rule, we arrive  at it = vt_x  - u*_r  Such a policy elimi- 




=  0. 
We have so far discussed only the properties  of the relative interest 
rate  rules, and their  implications  for relative  prices and exchange  rates. 
Equating  the right-hand  sides of (54)  and (56),  we have: 
air, + 8, = p(E,c,+1  -  ct) + Etpt+1  -  pr 
To  find the optimal value of bt,  we note that at the optimum, ct = Et_1ct 
and t, = Et_17r  Then,  using (58),  we get: 
S, = pEtct+1  + E,t,+1  + Efirf+1  = (1 -  v)EtTTt+1 
=  -(1  -  a)  R  _  p(l-q)[l-a(l-e)]_ 
2  Vt _ 
l-a(l-0p)  Vr 
By symmetry,  the optimal  foreign  monetary  policy sets: 




l-a(l-ep)  * 
The message is unchanged  from the model with money supply rules: 
Monetary  policy should target  anticipated  future shocks in such a way 
as to eliminate  unanticipated  changes in nominal exchange  rates. 
3.6  Conclusions 
An optimally designed monetary  policy must react differentially  to 
changes  in fundamentals  that  are  anticipated  and changes  that  are  unan- 
ticipated.  In practice,  of course, such a policy is not practical  to imple- Expectations,  Monetary  Policy,  and  the  Misalignment  of Prices  155 
ment. Our point here, however, is to stress that under the optimal pol- 
icy, unanticipated  changes to exchange rates are largely eliminated. 
There  should only be shocks to exchange  rates  when the current  funda- 
mentals change unexpectedly. But it is widely recognized that most 
exchange rate changes are in response to news about the future, not 
in response to the current levels of productivity or monetary policy. 
However we might in practice  implement  the optimal  policy,  a gauge of 
its success is that  the effects  of news on exchange  rates  is eliminated. 
We should emphasize that we are not attempting  here to develop a 
new insight about the deep properties of monetary policymaking in 
sticky-price  models. We have deliberately  built a series of models in 
which the only distortion  is nominal price stickiness, and the optimal 
policy is to replicate  the flexible  price  equilibrium.  The contribution  is a 
practical  one. By and large,  the flexible  price  equilibrium  will not be one 
in which anticipated  future  shocks,  which determine  the relative  prices 
of two currencies,  should determine  relative  goods prices.  Optimal  pol- 
icy should attempt  to eliminate  unanticipated  shocks to exchange  rates. 
We  note,  however,  that  our  model also has several  unrealistic  features. 
We have no durable  goods  -  either capital,  storable  inputs, or durable 
consumption  goods. Our  economy has complete and unrestricted  capi- 
tal  markets.  Our  future  work aims to assess realistic  policy rules  not only 
in economies that  have these realistic  features,  but also in economies in 
which agents receive  signals about future  fundamentals. 
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Notes 
1.  Engel and West (2004) and Engel, Mark, and West (2007) have  recently  argued  that 
present-value  models of exchange rates can account for a large fraction of the volatility of 
exchange rates, and potentially  all of the volatility  if we could measure such unobserved 
fundamentals  as money demand errors or monetary policy shocks. 
2.  See, for example, Smets and Wouters (2002), Devereux  and Engel (2003, 2007), Suther- 
land (2005), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Monacelli (2005), and Duarte and Obstfeld (2007). 156  Devereux  and Engel 
3. Although  it is frequently  stated  that  oil is priced  in dollars,  there  is no real  significance 
to that statement  since crude  oil is priced  on a spot market.  It is not a sticky  price  in any 
currency. 
4. This  statement  is not quite true,  because  a fully efficient  allocation  would require  that 
interest  rates  be set by the Friedman  rule.  But,  as is standard  in the literature,  we will as- 
sume that  the  weight  on real  balances  in the utility  function,  x, is vanishingly  small,  so that 
the utility  from  real  balances  is insignificant. 
5. Note that we have defined xt to be the world endowment of the commodity,  but by 
equation  (21),  it still fits our definition  of a world variable. 
6. Since  all variables  with a t subscript  are  known  at time  t, zt  means  the same  thing  as ttzr 
We  introduce  the z, because  it is used a lot and is less cumbersome. 
7. See, for example,  Obstfeld  and Rogoff (2000,  2002),  Devereux  and Engel (2003),  and 
Corsetti  and Pesenti  (2005). 
8. The  rule  is modified  because  it is assumed  that  even when firms  are  allowed to change 
prices,  the price  change  is not implemented  for  one period. 
9. For  example,  see Clarida,  Gali,  and Gertler  (2001,  2002),  Kollmann  (2002),  Benigno  and 
Benigno  (2003,  2006),  and Gali  and Monacelli  (2005). 
10. If  we do not alter  the model,  and leave real  balances  in the utility  function  (with  a very 
small  weight),  then  when an interest  rate  rule  is followed  we assume  the central  banks  ad- 
just the money supplies endogenously  so that  money market  equilibrium  attains  the de- 
sired  interest  rate. 
11. One small difference  is that our production  function  does not have output propor- 
tional  to labor  input,  since  we still assume  a (now constant)  input  of the commodity. 
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